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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Bob Boren pied guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm specifically preserving 
his right to assert on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
the charge. Mr. Boren timely appeals from the district court's Judgment and 
Commitment and Order of Probation on Suspended Execution of Judgment and asserts 
that, mindful of the language contained in the challenged statutes and the applicable 
standards of review, the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State charged Mr. Boren with unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of 
I.C. § 18-3316, based upon his knowing possession of firearms having been convicted 
of two out-of-state felonies: possession of a controlled substance - delivery in the State 
of Oregon in 1984, and possession of a controlled substance for purpose of sale in the 
State of Nevada in 1988. (R., pp.18-19.) Counsel for Mr. Boren filed a Motion to 
Dismiss and Memorandum Supporting the Motion to Dismiss. (R., pp.27-31.) 
Mr. Boren's basic argument was that pursuant to Idaho Code §18-310(2)(kk), because 
his felonies occurred prior to 1991, his gun rights in Idaho were automatically restored 
upon his final discharge from each felony case, despite the fact that his felonies 
occurred in states other than Idaho. (R., pp.27-31.) The State countered that because 
Mr. Boren's convictions were not Idaho convictions, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-
310(4), his gun rights were not restored automatically, and he was required to file a 
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petition with the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole pursuant to I.C. § 18-310(3). 
(Response Brief to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.) 1 
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the district court agreed with the State's 
interpretation of the relevant statutes and denied Mr. Boren's motion to dismiss. 
(R., pp.39-44; Tr. 11/8/11.) Mr. Boren entered into conditional guilty plea to the charge 
of felon in possession of a firearm, preserving his right to challenge the district court's 
denial of his motion to dismiss on appeal;2 in exchange, the State agreed to recommend 
a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, suspended, with Mr. Boren 
placed on probation. (R., pp.47-53; Tr. 12/20/11, p.1, L.4 - p.9, L.19.) The district court 
sentenced Mr. Boren to a unified term of three years, with one year fixed, and placed 
Mr. Boren on probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.54-58, 62-65; Tr. 1/31/12, 
p.30, Ls.8-14.) Mr. Boren filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.66-69.) 
1 Mr. Boren has filed a Motion to Augment the record with the State's Response Brief to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Motion to Augment is pending. 
2 Thus, Mr. Boren is precluded from raising any attacks to the constitutionality of Idaho 
Code § 18-310 in this appeal. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Boren's Motion to Dismiss? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Boren's Motion To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
Mindful of the language contained in the relevant statutes and the relevant 
standards of review, Mr. Boren asserts that the district court erred by denying his Motion 
to Suppress. 
B. Because His Convictions Pre-date 1991, And Because He Has Completed His 
Sentences, Mr. Boren Is Not Subject To The Firearm Prohibition Imposed By 
Idaho Code§ 18-3316(1) 
Mr. Boren was charged with violation Idaho Code § 18-3316(1) which reads as 
follows: 
A person who previously has been convicted of a felony who purchases, 
owns, possesses, or has under his custody or control any firearm shall be 
guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a period of 
time not to exceed five (5) years and by a fine not to exceed five thousand 
dollars ($5,000) 
I.C. § 18-3316(1). However, this section is modified by Idaho Code§ 18-3316(4) which 
reads, 
Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a person whose 
conviction has been nullified by expungement, pardon, setting aside the 
conviction or other comparable procedure by the jurisdiction where the 
felony conviction occurred; or whose civil right to bear arms either 
specifically or in combination with other civil rights has been 
restored by any other provision of Idaho law. 
I.C. § 18-3316(4) (emphasis added). Thus, a convicted felon may lawfully possess a 
firearm in Idaho provided that their right to bear arms has been restored by provisions of 
Idaho law. 
Idaho Code § 18-310(1) provides that a sentence to the custody of the Idaho 
state board of corrections suspends all civil rights, "provided further that any such 
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person may lawfully exercise all civil rights that are not political during any period of 
parole or probation, except the right to ship, transport, possess or receive a 
firearm, and the right to refuse treatment authorized by the sentencing court." 
I.C. § 18-310(1) (emphasis added). Thus, while a felon is under the custody of the 
Idaho state board of corrections, that felon may not lawfully possess a firearm. 
Furthermore, Idaho Code§ 18-310(2) provides, 
Upon final discharge, a person convicted of any Idaho felony shall be 
restored the full rights of citizenship, except that for persons convicted 
of treason or those offenses enumerated in paragraphs (a) through 
(jj) of this subsection the right to ship, transport, possess or receive 
a firearm shall not be restored. As used in this subsection, "final 
discharge" means satisfactory completion of imprisonment, probation and 
parole as the case may be 
I.C. § 18-310(2) (emphasis added).3 Idaho Code § 18-310(3) allows a person to apply 
to the commission of pardons and parole to have their right to possess a firearm 
restored, at any time five years after final discharge. I.C. § 18-310(3). Thus, while most 
of a convicted felon's civil rights are automatically restored upon final discharge, the 
right to bear arms is not. 
However, these provisions generally do not apply to people convicted of most of 
the enumerated felonies (including delivery or possession with the intent to deliver a 
controlled substance), if that conviction occurred prior to July 1, 1991, as § 18-
310(2)(kk) states, 
The provisions of this subsection shall apply only to those persons 
convicted of the enumerated felonies in paragraphs (a) through (jj) of 
3 It was uncontested that Mr. Boren's prior out-of-state convictions are covered by this 
code section. Idaho Code § 18-310(2)(dd), describes "felonious manufacture, delivery 
or possession with the intent to manufacture or deliver, or possession of a controlled or 
counterfeit substance (37-2732, Idaho Code)," which Mr. Boren concedes describes the 
Idaho equivalent of felony possession of a controlled substance - delivery, as defined 
by Oregon law, and possession of a controlled substance for purpose of sale, as 
defined by Nevada law. 
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this subsection on or after July 1, 1991, except that persons convicted 
of the felonies enumerated in paragraphs (s) and (t) of this subsection, for 
any degree of murder or voluntary manslaughter, shall not be restored the 
right to ship, transport, possess or receive a firearm regardless of the date 
of their conviction if the conviction was the result of an offense committed 
by use of a firearm. 
I. C. § 18-310(2)(kk). Therefore, reading these provisions in pari materia people 
convicted of felonies prior to July 1, 1991, have their right to possess firearms 
automatically restored upon final discharge of their convictions. 4 
However, Idaho Code§ 18-310(4) reads as follows: 
Persons convicted of felonies in other states or jurisdictions shall be 
allowed to register and vote in Idaho upon final discharge which means 
satisfactory completion of imprisonment, probation and parole as the case 
may be. These individuals shall not have the right restored to ship, 
transport, possess or receive a firearm, in the same manner as an 
Idaho felon as provided in subsection (2) of this section. 
I.C. § 18-310(4) (emphasis added). Thus, the question presented to the district court 
was whether, reading all of these statutes together, Idaho law treats individuals 
convicted of felonies the same regardless of where their felony convictions occurred. 
Mr. Boren argued the following during the hearing on his motion to dismiss: 
And so it appears from [I.C. § 18-310] subsection (2) that we're 
talking about people who have been convicted of Idaho felonies, which is 
the argument the State presents in its brief. 
However, ifwe turn to [1.C. § 18-310] subsection (4), it appears that 
the legislature has anticipated the fact that it's only speaking about Idaho 
felonies there, and it incorporates subsection (2) into subsection (4). 
It says, "Persons convicted of felonies in other states or 
jurisdictions shall be allowed to register and vote in Idaho upon final 
discharge, which means satisfactory completion of imprisonment, 
probation and parole, as the case may be. These individuals shall not 
have the right restored to ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm, in 
4 It appears that prior to April 1, 1991, a convicted felon's right to possess firearms was 
automatically restored, along with most other civil rights, upon final discharge. See 
I.C. § 18-310 (1990). 
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the same manner as an Idaho felony as provided in subsection (2) of this 
section." 
Subsection (4) specifically references subsection (2) and says 'in 
the same manner.' I think that's pretty clear language. I don't think 
there's any ambiguity that's left there. 
In other words, we're coming - we have to go full circle now. Now 
we're talking about an out-of-state felony, and we're talking about an out-
of-state felony in subsection (4). Subsection (4) directs us to treat that in 
the same manner as an Idaho felon in subsection (2). 
So we return to subsection (2) with all of its enumerated felonies, 
including [I.C. § 18-310(2)] subsection (kk). And subsection (kk) tells us 
that this subsection applies to only persons convicted of the enumerated 
felonies, but not the enumerated felonies if the conviction was before July 
15', 1991. 
I think the statute is very clear as to that. I don't think there's any 
ambiguity here. If there were ambiguity - just for sake of argument, if 
there were ambiguity in this statue, then the rule of lenity would require 
that we interpret the statute in favor of the defendant when possible. 
But I don't think there is ambiguity in this statute. I think the 
statute's very clear. And given the fact that Bob Boren's felonies in this 
case, only one of which the State has provided a judgment of conviction 
on in this case, are before 1991. 
And so I think it's very clear that this case should be dismissed and 
that's what we ask the Court to do. 
(Tr. 11/8/11, p.5, L.5 - p.7, L.2.) The State argued that the statute unambiguously 
distinguishes between those with Idaho felonies prior to 1991, and those with out-of-
state felonies prior to 1991 - the former have their right to possess firearms 
automatically restored upon final discharge, while the latter must seek relief through the 
provisionsofl.C. § 18-310(3) (Tr.11/8/11, p.7, L.5-p.8, L.21.) 
During the motion to dismiss hearing, the district court stated the following: 
I think [I.C. § 18-310] subsection (4) draws a distinction between -
between persons convicted of felonies in other states in terms of 
restoration of their voting rights versus the restoration of the right to 
possess or receive a firearm. 
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It seems to do that, but if you look at the statement of purpose in 
the session laws, which counsel haven't cited to those, but that would be 
2004 Idaho Laws, Chapter 166, Felony Convictions, Restoration of Rights. 
The Statement of purpose says, "This legislation clarifies the 
restoration of voting rights of persons convicted of a felony in another 
state or jurisdiction." And it doesn't say that it clarifies the restoration of 
the right to possess or receive a firearm. It draws a distinction, I think, 
between those two things. 
My inclination - my inclination is to deny the motion based on - I 
don't think it's that clear at all. But I mean, in terms of sorting through the 
statute and what the statement of purpose seems to indicate, that the 
legislature intended to draw a distinction between those two things. 
So for purposes of moving forward, I think that what I'm going to is 
tentatively deny the motion to dismiss, reserve the right to put something 
in writing, but that is the answer. 
(Tr. 11/8/11, p.9, L.14 - p.10, L.15.) In its written ruling, the district court found that "by 
its express language, section 310(2) does not operate to restore Boren's right to bear 
arms after final discharge from the alleged out-of-state convictions." (R., p.42.) 
Furthermore, the district court found, "by its express language, section 18-310(4) does 
not operate to restore Boren's right to bear arms after final discharge from the alleged 
out-of-state convictions." (R., p.42.) The district court, thus, denied Mr. Boren's motion 
to dismiss.5 
Mr. Boren asserts that this Court should review his motion to dismiss de nova. 
There is no dispute over the relevant facts of this case: Mr. Boren was convicted of 
5 The thrust of the district court's ruling is Idaho law treats people with out-of-state 
felonies less favorably in terms of restoration of Second Amendment rights than it treats 
people with Idaho felonies. Assuming but not conceding the district court's 
interpretation is correct, Idaho Code § 18-310 is subject to a Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection I right to travel constitutional challenge. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 
489 (1999); State v. Yeoman, 149 Idaho 505 (2010). As this challenge was not made in 
the district court and no right to raise such a challenge was preserved through his 
conditional guilty plea, Mr. Boren reserves his right to raise this claim through post-
conviction proceedings. 
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felonies in states other than Idaho, prior to 1991; he has since been finally "discharged" 
of those felonies have served all sentencing obligations; and, he possessed a firearm in 
Canyon County on July 15, 2011. Mr. Boren asserts that the relevant statutes, Idaho 
Code §§ 18-310 and 18-3316, show that his right to possess a firearm was 
automatically restored upon his discharge of his prior felonies and; therefore, as a 
matter law, he cannot be convicted of violating I.C. § 18-3316. 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review by 
an appellate court. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865 (2011). The following 
principles of statutory interpretation apply: 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the 
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with 
the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read in 
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document. 
The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given 
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court 
must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none 
will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be 
given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory 
construction. 
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67 (2011) (citing Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 
147 Idaho 307, 310 (2009).) "'The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be 
strictly construed in favor of defendants."' State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2008) 
(quoting State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 380 (1993) overruled on other grounds (citing 
State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 325 (1990))). The power to correct a socially or 
otherwise unsound statute lies with the legislature, and not the judiciary. Verska v. St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892-893 (2011). 
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Mindful of the express language contained in the relevant statutes and the 
statutory construction rules articulated above, Mr. Boren asserts that the district court 
erred in denying his motion to dismiss. 
C. By Application Of The Rule Of Lenity, The District Court Erred In Denying 
Mr. Boren's Motion To Dismiss 
Mr. Boren asserts that, too the extent that the statutory language is ambiguous, 
the district court erred by failing to apply the "Rule of Lenity," which requires the court to 
strictly construe a statute in a defendant's favor. Thus, the district court erred in 
denying Mr. Boren's motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Boren respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a felon, and to remand this case to the district court with 
instructions that the charge be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 19th day of September, 2012. 
~_,-~µ..) _,__~.:,____:_t_)_/ ----1,...::...1 _.w:_:.; i 1-ii,v1 fc,A____, 
S N C. PINTLER / 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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